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Introduction: a French identity crisis? 
 
September 11, 2001 shed new light on multiculturalism in France and in Europe. 
Before these tragic events, immigration, cultural and ethnic diversity were issues raised only 
by the extreme-right parties, the best known being the French National Front, and only a 
small part of the electorate  considered terrorism the most important political issue.1 Since the 
re-election of Jacques Chirac, the situation has changed dramatically. France has engaged in 
serious debate on the relationships between Islam and the Republic (the Islamic scarf, 
Mahomet drawings and freedom of speech, creation of the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman – French Council on the Muslim Faith, etc…). Recently a new theme has 
emerged: the question of the Islamization of French society, popularized by Philippe de 
Villiers, leader of MPF, a right-wing, anti-European political party. The MPF propagates the 
fear that Islamist organizations would take advantage of the increasing number of Muslims to 
legitimize and impose their values and way of life on the rest of the national community.2  
Simultaneously, doubts have been cast on the desire of the latest immigrant waves – 
mostly from Maghrebian and African origins- to join the French mainstream. Traditional 
critics of immigration state that immigrants try to take advantage of the French welfare-
system and steal jobs from French born citizens.  Current criticism of immigration focuses on 
the belief that immigrants refuse to enter into mainstream French society. The public 
perception is that France would become a “communautarist” society, like the Anglo-Saxon 
nations (following the representation of these polities as portrayed by many French academics 
and politicians), where specific groups would demand and obtain special treatment thus 
ignoring the Republican ideal of equality among citizens.  French essayist, Alain Finkielkraut 
interpreted the riots of November 2005 as an ethnic and religious uprising against the rest of 
society.  
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  Preoccupation with the French immigration question is not limited to the elite. In two 
opinion surveys conducted over a six month period (April 2005 and December 2005) the 
percentage of respondents who answered that the number of immigrants was too high in 
France rose from 49% to 64%. When asked whether they thought that “France has a debt 
toward those who come from its ex-colonies” those that disagreed rose from 36% in April to 
48% in December. Such dramatic changes in opinion polls can best be explained by the 
rioting in the suburbs. In fact, after running a hierarchical classification using several values 
questions (both socio-economical and cultural), we identified a particular class of voters 
which constitutes two thirds of the rightist electorate, which we named “the closed right”. 
These voters are characterized by a very specific interpretation of the November 2005 riots. 
The remainder of the electorate stressed the socioeconomic reasons behind the riots and 
blamed the discrimination of French society against the youth in the suburbs. The “closed 
right”, on the other hand blamed the riots on problems resulting from immigration and 
integration. They consider that those living in the suburbs rather than French society at large 
are mainly responsible for the crisis: The primary reason for the riots is anti-French racism 
(41% of responses), ahead of the effects of television news (38%), Islamic organizations and 
gangs (35% each, multiple answers allowed). The “closed right” explains the crisis by a lack 
of parental control (47%), unemployment (29%), immigration (26%) and the insufficient 
number of police officers in the suburbs (24%) whereas for the rest of the sample, 
unemployment and discrimination were the primary reasons. The closed right favors 
conservative or repressive policies to solve the problems in the suburbs including more 
restrictive laws against illegal immigration (96%), a contract of parental responsibility (88%), 
an increase in the number of police officers (87%), automatic expulsion of foreign rioters 
(84%), more restrictive conditions regarding the rights of immigrants to bring family 
members to France (76%), whereas the rest of the electorate focused on social responses 
 3
including increased funding for public schools, better public housing, and education to fight 
discrimination.  
The context surrounding immigration and multiculturalism raises several questions. 
Are the French suffering an identity crisis? Do they question their capacity to integrate the 
new waves of immigration (though some of these immigrants have lived in the country for 
three generations)? Does French public opinion reflect the debate over Huntington’s clash of 
civilization theory? We will address these questions by examining the relationship between 
the opinion of the French electorate regarding the question of immigrants’ integration. Several 
points of tension between the French electorate and those of immigrant origin will appear 
including islamophobia. We will compare the attitudes and behaviors of the “new French” i.e. 
the French of immigrant origin to determine whether the integration process in France has 
failed. 
 
Data 
 In this paper we will use data from the CEVIPOF survey “Rapport au politique des 
Français issus de l’immigration – The political implications of the French of immigrant 
origin” (RAPFI).3 The field institute TNS-SOFRES conducted the poll, using the 
questionnaire drawn up by the CEVIPOF research team, between April 8th and May 7th 2005, 
with a representative sample – called RAPFI – of 1,003 French citizens who emigrated from 
Africa and Turkey aged 18 year and older. A “mirror” survey was also conducted, between 
April 13th and April 21st 2005, with a representative sample of the French electorate– called 
the “control sample” – of 1,006 18-year and older individuals. Both consisted of a phone 
interview which lasted 35 minutes on average.  In both cases, a base of surveys representative 
of the two types of households was set up using the quota method (respectively INSEE EHF 
survey4 and INSEE Employment survey). Among this base, phone numbers were randomly 
 4
selected. With the exception of a few necessary adaptations, the questionnaires used in both 
surveys were identical, in wording as well as in the order of the questions. The methodology 
used ensures a reliable and systematic comparison of the two samples.  
The RAPFI survey is unique in the field of minority studies in France. First, the 
population of interest was defined to avoid bias. Previous surveys defined the population by 
selecting only individuals of the Islamic faith or by their birthplace. Both these criteria are 
biased: What about the French of immigrant origin who are atheist or practice another 
religion? What about the pieds-noirs of Algeria who do not identify themselves as 
immigrants? Our study includes individuals of French citizenship having at least one parent or 
grandparent who held or still holds the nationality of one of the following countries: Turkey, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, or any other African nation. We therefore include in our sample 
naturalized immigrants, first and second generation born in France, whether of mixed heritage 
or not. Second, by using the EHF survey and the CATI procedure, this survey is the first to be 
controlled by quotas thus correcting the methodological errors of previous polls.5 Most 
previous polls were based on face-to-face interviews and are biased since they chose densely 
populated urban areas to minimize the cost of the polls.  These areas have disproportionately 
high numbers of foreigners. Our method, though more labor intensive, remedies this bias: 
28,000 individuals were interviewed to make up a representative sample of 1,003 
respondents. Lastly, the RAPFI survey is the first survey which explores specific dimensions 
such as integration, perception of racism and relationships toward Islam, but also general 
dimensions including politics, values systems and policies preferences, whereas the French of 
immigrant origin were only surveyed on matters such as Islam or secularization. 
 
The French and their models of integration 
 
 
Integration: a preliminary assessment 
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Table 1. Opinions about integration 
 RAPFI Survey 
Immigrant-
origin French 
Mirror sample 
French electorate 
The immigrants’ situation will worsen in the future. (%) 27% 26% 
There are too many immigrants in France. (% agree) 37% 47% 
In France, everybody can succeed regardless of skin color. (% 
agree) 
49% 43% 
Immigrants can easily integrate into French society. (%) 41% 33% 
Concerning the problem of integration, the responsibility 
comes mostly from the immigrants who do not try hard 
enough. (%) 
26% 48% 
Concerning the problem of integration, the responsibility is 
mostly that of French society. (%) 
59% 39% 
 
Several differences between the French of immigrant origin and the rest of the 
electorate are noteworthy. First, the French of African, Maghrebian or Turkish origin 
responded more often than the mirror respondents that French society is color-blind and that 
immigrants can be easily assimilated. They are also less often prejudiced against immigrants 
(not because they are of a particular ethnic origin but because they are younger and therefore 
better educated). They believe that integration difficulties are due to societal attitudes rather 
than immigrants’ behavior.  
Second, respondents in the mirror sample focused more on the question of religion. 
Their perception of whether the number of immigrants is excessive does not change their 
position on the difficulty of immigrants’ integration (roughly a third of the respondents think 
that immigrants can easily integrate into the French mainstream). This is not the case when 
Islam is considered. Forty three percent of the mirror respondents felt slightly or very 
negatively toward Islam (17% in the RAPFI survey) and negativity toward this particular 
religion colors their attitude of immigrants’ capacity to join the French mainstream. When 
respondents in the mirror population judged the Muslim religion positively, 48% of them said 
that integration of immigrants would be easy, whereas among those who viewed Islam most 
negatively, this proportion drops to 28%.      
Furthermore, when assigning responsibility for integration problems in France, the 
differences between the “new French” and the rest of the electorate are even greater. French 
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of immigrant origin, whatever their ideological leaning or level of ethnocentrism, blamed 
society more often than they did immigrants.  Among the electorate as a whole, the variations 
are even more dramatic. If French society is considered color-blind by respondents, 
immigrants are held responsible for immigration problems and not society. On the contrary, 
when respondents recognize racial discrimination in France, the society as a whole, rather 
than immigrants is blamed for the problems of integration. Furthermore, when the mirror 
respondents answer questions on the integration process, they simultaneously answer 
questions on the compatibility of Islam with French society. When respondents view this 
religion positively, society is blamed, when they view Islam negatively, immigrants are 
blamed. The integration issue is therefore not only the traditional economical and political 
debate but more recently a religious question in secular France. The fundamental question is 
whether Islam, the French identity and the French mainstream can be jointly reconciled?  
 
The French models of integration 
The French are so clearly divided on the integration process in France and the capacity 
of immigrants to join the mainstream because the general public holds several different views 
of integration.  
 
 
 
Table 2. For you today, what is the most important? 
 
That immigrants join the rest of 
society without conflict? 
Or that they petition for 
special rights even if it 
creates tensions?  
DK Total 
RAPFI Survey 54 43 3 100 
Mirror survey 65 32 3 100 
 
To treat every French person 
equally? 
Or to struggle against 
discrimination?  
DK Total 
RAPFI Survey 41 59 0 100 
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Mirror survey 58 41 1 100 
 
To value the cultural differences 
among the French? 
Or to highlight what the 
French have in common?  
DK Total 
RAPFI Survey 43 55 2 100 
Mirror survey 31 67 2 100 
 
The responses of the majorities are the same for two of three questions, in both 
samples. The sample groups’ answers differ sharply though on the choice between equal 
treatment for every French person and the struggle against discrimination, the general public 
being focused on the first and the RAPFI respondents on the second. This could be the 
consequence of demands for special treatment, or evidence of immigrants’ resistance towards 
assimilation. This is not as simple as it appears as we will demonstrate. 
Using a hierarchical classification based on these three questions and the item 
concerning the responsibility for the integration problem, we have identified three specific 
groups of French voters, each of them with different models of integration. The first group, 
the assimilationists make up 46% of the mirror sample, the second group, the republicans, 
count for 36% of the sample and the third, the multiculturalists, constitute 8%. Each group 
helps to shed light on the question of integration. 
The assimilationists believe the following: immigrants are responsible for the 
integration problem and not society (100% of their responses) and to be assimilated, 
immigrants do not have special rights (78%), under a framework of equal treatment (70%) 
and of cultural commonality (72%). Ethnocentrism is highest among this group (67% think 
there are too many immigrants in France, in comparison with 49% at the sample level).  
Assimilationists also score high  on two traditional questions measuring authoritarianism in 
the sociological field,: 66% of them value discipline over the development of critical thinking  
at school, and 41% of them believe in the re-establishment of capital punishment, versus 50% 
and 32% of the overall sample. They also most often belong to the Catholic Church (76%) 
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and are the most critical toward Islam: 55% of them feel negatively toward this religion, in 
comparison with less than 40% of negative feelings among the two others groups. Clearly, 
they are the least open to a society made up of many cultures and religions. For them, 
immigrants must be assimilated and thus abandon that which makes them different from the 
rest of French society. Integration means accepting the French way of life.        
Assimilationists and republicans share some common beliefs, particularly their 
preference for equal treatment (75% of their responses), their insistence on what the French 
have in common rather than their cultural diversity (77% of responses) and their wish for 
integration to be achieved without immigrants’ demands for special rights. The major 
difference with the first group is their opinion that society is responsible when integration is 
problematic (78% of them place the blame on society, the remaining 22% think that 
responsibility for the difficulties of immigrations is shared by immigrants and society). The 
republicans clearly voice their commitment to the traditional model of the French Republic, or 
at least the one to which political elites refer when talking about the Republic, and cannot be 
portrayed as anti-immigrant. In contrast to the assimilationists, only 29% of them consider the 
number of immigrants in France too high and only 37% feel negatively toward the Muslim 
religion. These respondents are mostly left wing (48% in comparison with 27% of the first 
group) and are opposed to the death penalty (80%). The republicans also rated the 
development of critical thinking (61%) as more important than discipline in the schools. They 
share with the assimilationists the wish that migrants join the French mainstream, but their 
definitions of this mainstream differ greatly from the definition of the first group.  
The gap between republicans and assimilationists is wide on several topics (tolerance 
toward Islam, the death penalty, and responsibility for problems with integration). The 
republicans value a society based on tolerance toward ethnic diversity at the private level and 
on republican neutrality at the public level, whereas assimilationists are more intolerant in 
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matters of ethnic and religious diversity, (even when they are private) and closer to a 
traditional vision of French society, where authority is strong. Furthermore, republicans are 
much more in favor of public policies to promote integration which demonstrates their 
judgement that society is responsible for difficulties in the integration process, whereas 
assimilationists disagree. 30% of republicans support public funding for building mosques in 
France, 70% favour budgetary increases for schools with a high proportion of immigrants and 
51% agree with quotas for social housing dedicated to immigrant families. Assimilationists 
answered those questions respectively only 16%, 48% and 36%. Republicans are in favour of 
state intervention for overcoming the difficulty for immigrants to join the French mainstream 
whereas assimilationists consider migrants as solely responsible for their destiny.         
The multiculturalists share certain beliefs with the republicans. They both have 
positive attitudes toward Islam (62%) and think that society is responsible for failures in the 
integration process (86%). They also reject the re-establishment of the death penalty (75%), 
the teaching of discipline at school (62%) or ethnocentric prejudice (only 25% think 
immigrants are too numerous in France). As for the republicans, they are left wing in their 
politics (53%) and are highly educated (63% of them earned the baccalauréat or college 
degree)6. They favour a particular model of integration though. The multiculturalists are 
equally divided between the acceptance and refusal of immigrants’ demands for special rights. 
They unanimously believe in the fight to end discrimination and promote cultural diversity 
rather than commonality. Not surprisingly, the multiculturalists are in favor of public and 
state intervention to promote both cultural diversity and the integration of immigrants. 81% 
support increased public spending on schools with high immigrant populations and quotas for 
public housing for immigrant families. Fifty-eight percent promote affirmative action for 
immigrants in the private and public sectors and 55% favour public funding for mosques in 
France. Their model of integration is clearly grounded in a society which recognizes and even 
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promotes ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, in contrast to the public neutrality favored by 
the republicans.     
The various groups of French that we polled view integration differently; the 
multiculturalists readily accept immigrants and even view their cultural differences as a 
benefit to the nation while assimilationists believe that immigrants must merge into the 
French mainstream and believe that they are solely responsible for that process. The 
particularity of assimilationists is their ethnocentricity and their religious prejudice. Rejection 
of Islam is not new but this survey demonstrates the connection with this particular model of 
integration. The religious factor could also preclude positive evaluation of the immigrants’ 
integration according to the republicans. As previously shown, republicans are less accepting 
of religious differences when those differences become public. The numerous public stances 
voiced by Islamic organizations such as the UOIF (Union des organisations islamiques de 
France), could, in the long run, polarize republicans. Furthermore, among both 
assimilationists and republicans, integration has a shared common goal; immigrants must 
become “French citizens just like the others,” which means no preferential treatment or rights. 
In both groups, integration would be considered unsuccessful if immigrants do not try to join 
the mainstream and remain apart from the rest of society. But is that true? Do people of the 
Islamic faith demand special treatment? Can Islam and French secularization co-exist? How 
realistic is the threat of ethnic separation?    
  
Islam: representation and reality 
 
Diversity among Muslims 
Several scholarly studies have addressed the question of Islam in French society 
usually by relying on in-depth interviews of French and non-French Muslims.7 One problem 
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with this method is that this type of definition, exaggerates the weight of religious identity in 
individual value systems. It is also noteworthy that in dealing with a marginal part of the 
French population (4%), quantitative analysis is often complex. The RAPFI survey is 
therefore a very useful tool to examine the conclusions of these scholars. Among them, 
Jocelyne Cesari hypothesizes that there is not a departure from the Islamic culture for the new 
French and their children.8 Our findings contradict this assumption: first, there are strong 
differences in terms of modal denomination (Catholics for the electorate as a whole and 
Muslims for the RAPFI respondents), but it is false to categorize French as Catholics or to 
categorize Maghrebian- African- and Turkish-French as Muslims only; second, though less 
numerous in proportion than the electorate as a whole, atheists account for 20% of the new 
French.   
 
Table 3. Religious affiliation 
 Catholic Muslim Other religion  Atheist 
RAPFI Survey 13 60 7 20 
Mirror survey 66 2 4 28 
 
Furthermore, the social logic behind the Islamic denomination must be examined. 
Three phenomena are opposed to the traditional findings of the sociology of religion, 
particularly in the study of Catholics.9  First generational renewal does not attenuate the 
religious affiliation of this population: Among the mirror respondents, atheists account for 
45% of the 18-25 years old individuals, and 19% of the 50 year or older individuals, whereas 
among the new French the proportion of atheists remains more or less the same. Second, 
education level is positively correlated to atheism. This is true for both populations, but the 
relationship is weaker among the new French. Among the RAPFI, 17% of the less educated 
practice no religion. This is the case of 25% of the college educated, whereas among the same 
groups, the proportion of those practicing no religion increases from 17% to 33%. Religion in 
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general and the Islamic denomination in particular are therefore more widespread among the 
immigrant French and their children, than in the overall electorate. 
 
Table 4. A comparison of the importance of religion amongst Catholics and Muslims 
Religion is very or 
extremely important. (% 
agree) 
Regular attendees Irregular attendees No attendance 
Mirror Catholics 61 19 ** 
RAPFI Muslims  95 75 55 
 
 
Finally, religiosity in Islam does not follow the same trend as among Catholics. To 
analyze the connection with religious beliefs among the Catholic French, scholars usually 
study mass attendance i.e. Catholics who believe they have a moral obligation to regularly go 
to church. Using only this indicator, French Catholics and French Muslims would have a 
similar level of regular attendees: nearly 20% of them go to church or the mosque at least 
once a month. But the percentage of irregular attendees compared to those who attend a 
religious ceremony differ: 87% of French Catholics surveyed attend mass only for marriage, 
burial or religious events and 3% never go to church, whereas among the Muslims the 
respective proportions are 45% and 35%. Following the traditional analysis of religiosity, 
these privatized Muslims would be seen as being in conflict with their religious beliefs, but 
this is not the case. As shown in the above table, when asked whether religion is important in 
their everyday life, there is a marked difference between Catholics who attend mass regularly 
and those who do not. This clearly demonstrates that among the second group religious 
denomination should not be taken at face value. It is more a cultural distinction than a strong 
religious tie.10 But Muslims are different: Religion plays a bigger role in their everyday lives 
regardless of whether they attend mosque services. There are therefore various ways of being 
a Muslim in France. And the relevant indicators to understand the Catholic religiosity do not 
fit the Muslim religiosity. So, considering all the different indicators, we set up a hierarchical 
clustering analysis comprised of four groups of Muslims. The different dimensions of the 
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involvement in the Muslim religion can be summed up by three criteria: the importance of 
religion, the level of compliance with some religious norms in private and the level of mosque 
attendance. The four groups – nominal Muslims, customary believers, private followers and 
the orthodox i.e. those who regularly attend mosque services - present some different and 
systematic features related to these three dimensions (see Table 5): 1. The lowest level of 
involvement in every indicator characterizes the nominal Muslims; 2. Regular attendance at 
mosque distinguishes orthodox worshipers from other types of Muslims; 3. The systematic 
individual compliance with the religious rules in private distinguishes the private followers 
from 4. the customary believers who limit their religious involvement to cultural tradition. 
 
Table 5: A typology of the involvement in Islam among French Muslims 
 
Nominal
Muslims
Customary believers Private 
followers 
Orthodox 
attenders 
Religion extremely important 0 31 28 52 
Religion very important 12 56 53 46 
     
Religion more important than before 16 40 50 62 
Religion less important than before 39 12 9 11 
     
Better worshipper than their parents 1 6 26 30 
Worse worshipper than their parents 82 82 50 40 
     
Never drink alcohol 49 73 94 95 
     
Pray every day 0 0 92 84 
Never pray 76 39 0 1 
     
Fast during the whole Ramadan 66 87 86 96 
     
Do not want to go on pilgrimage 42 8 9 1 
Want to go on pilgrimage 58 92 90 88 
Have already gone on pilgrimage 0 0 2 10 
     
Attendance at least once a week  0 0 0 93 
From time to time  2 39 45 0 
Only for religious ceremonies 22 28 18 0 
Never 76 31 33 0 
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N 101 179 164 112 
% in the sample of Muslims 18 32 30 20 
 
These results shed new light on the public policies designed by the French State. 
Interior Minister and French Presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy created a Conseil 
Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) based on the election of representatives of the 
mosques, not of the entire Muslim community. These representatives are not even elected by 
all regular mosque attendees, but by a minority of electors designated by the local imams. 
This institutional framework is not by itself troublesome, since one of CFCM’s missions is to 
organize the conditions of the Muslim faith. But the CFCM is also used by political, social 
and media actors to represent the whole Muslim community. Islamic groups including the 
UOIF exploit the legitimacy created through this institution to impose their views on various 
issues such as wearing the Islamic veil in school. And clearly they draw their legitimacy on a 
very unrepresentative sample of the Muslims, as the analysis of values and attitudes systems 
will demonstrate.           
 
The relationship between Islam, attitudes toward secularization and cultural issues 
 
Is the Islamic faith incompatible with French Republican values, as most French 
citizens think? Is French secularization viewed as an obstacle by French Muslims? Is Islam 
systematically associated with conservative beliefs which create tensions with the rest of the 
polity? Are assimilationists correct in their view that Islam is not part of the French way of 
life? Are republicans correct in thinking that religion should not be a public matter? To 
address these questions, we have compiled the attitudes of the different groups of French 
Muslims and other French of immigrant origin on what are often referred to as the cultural 
issues. 
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Table 6. Religious issues and religious affiliation 
 Muslims Other 
religion 
Atheists Mirror 
survey Nominal 
Muslims 
Customary 
believers
Private 
followers
Orthodox 
attenders 
Secularization (% 
positive) 
 
88 83 79 77 83 81 80 
Christian religion (% 
positive) 
 
84 91 87 94 86 69 72 
Secularization is an 
obstacle for religious 
freedom. (% agree) 
22 42 42 49 27 25 20 
Muslims do not have 
problems practicing their 
faith in France. (% agree) 
51 56 56 62 57 54 54 
Secularization is the only 
way for people with 
different beliefs to live 
harmoniously.(% agree) 
94 84 79 77 78 85 81 
Specific religious menus 
in public school 
cafeterias (% agree) 
56 81 80 89 58 59 41 
Wearing the Islamic 
scarf in class (% agree) 
 
33 52 52 76 22 22 17 
Wish to enroll children 
in public secular school 
(%) 
84 72 63 45 63 87 66 
Wish to enroll children 
in public school where 
religious education is 
allowed (%) 
6 14 21 38 11 4 14 
No sexual relations for 
women before marriage 
(% agree) 
20 51 59 67 14 7 8 
Homosexuality is an 
acceptable way to 
express one’s sexuality. 
(% agree) 
65 53 45 35 72 83 81 
Jews have too much 
power in France. (% 
agree) 
41 51 46 55 38 26 21 
Too many immigrants in 
France  
(% agree) 
32 37 44 44 38 24 47 
Re-establishment of the 
death penalty (% agree) 17 23 25 15 33 17 32 
 
The results concerning secularization are not as straightforward as some may think. 
The general attitude of French Muslims toward secularization is as positive as that of the rest 
of the society. This is also the case when the role of secularization is seen as a means to bring 
people with different beliefs and religions together. Differences appear when secularization 
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and religious freedom are linked: Muslims view secularization as an obstacle twice more 
often than the electorate as a whole. This could be interpreted as tension between the French 
way of life and that of Muslims, but Muslims respond differently to this question (49% of the 
orthodox vs. 22% of the nominal Muslims). Second, several Muslims support adaptation of 
secular rules rather than rejection of the laicity as shown by the strong support for their 
enrollment in the current French public school system. Expressing the wish to adapt cafeteria 
menus to the religion of the pupils is not as anti-laic as it may seem. Third, a strong gap exists 
between the orthodox and the rest of the Islamic community. Regular mosque attendees are 
the only group who support wearing the Islamic scarf in class by a majority and are the 
strongest supporters for “religion-friendly” public schools. In conclusion, as a whole Islam 
and laicity are not considered antagonistic by a strong majority of Muslims, but a small 
minority requests major changes in the way immigrants are treated by French society. 
It is therefore not surprising to find that the orthodox are more conservative in terms of 
sexual tolerance (both for women and gays) and are also more anti-Semitic.11 This is not to 
say that regular attendance is systematically associated with conservatism, as shown by the 
questions on the death penalty or ethnocentrism, but, clearly on several points, the orthodox 
differ strongly from the rest of Muslims and the rest of society (65% of homophobic attitudes 
among the orthodox, vs. 35% among nominal Muslims and 19% among the electorate as a 
whole). It also shows that Islam alone cannot be equated with conservatism and that the 
CFCM must not be seen as representative of the entire Muslim community.  
In summary, tensions between Islam and the French way of life are too often 
exaggerated. A majority of Muslims express no particular resentment toward the French way 
of life, some ask for small but not radical changes; only a minority of them, mostly regular 
mosque attendees, place the French model into question. When the religious factor is 
considered, the results are positive in terms of integration.    
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A clash of identities? 
While the religious identity of immigrants may not be as threatening as politicians and 
a significant part of the electorate claim, another question of the integration process remains: 
is the French polity significantly pressured by an increase of minority-specific demands? 
Does the communautarist threat correspond to a real claim voiced by the French of immigrant 
origin, and particularly by the Muslim French? As shown before, the electorate as a whole 
strongly opposes the demand for special treatment or the claim for the recognition of cultural 
diversity. Behind these attitudes, the respondents express their opposition to a perceived 
growing movement of ethnic and religious pressure against Republican neutrality. They view 
special treatment as separation from the rest of society i.e. that some members of the Republic 
would live by specific rules and not by general laws. For them cultural diversity would mean 
being of a particular origin or religion rather than being French and a member of the national 
community. But is that necessarily the case? Are the French of immigrant origin less 
“French” than the rest of society? Can an individual have distinct political, national, religious 
and social identities as some think, or are they mutually exclusive?  
These are complex questions both for theoretical and empirical reasons. The wording 
and ordering of the questions in the survey could influence the level of “communautarism” by 
either over-estimating or under-estimating the phenomenon12. We chose therefore not to 
mention the population targeted by the survey and to ask the identities questions at the 
beginning of the interview before questions concerning affirmative action, discrimination, 
religious beliefs and attitudes could influence their thinking and exaggerate a feeling of 
belonging to a specific group. Finally the identities questions take the form of a battery of 
groups’ proximity (generation, social milieu, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities)13. If 
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the Turkish-, African- and Maghrebian-French differ from the rest of the electorate in terms of 
identities, the inter-sample comparison will reveal that.   
 
Table 7. Inter-sample comparison of proximity to several groups 
Very close or close to the RAPFI Survey Mirror Survey 
Residents of your neighborhood 69 % 73% 
French 85% 84% 
Citizens of other European countries 56% 59% 
Citizens of the country from which your family 
emigrated 
77% ** 
People of your age 89% 87% 
People of your social background 87% 88% 
People who share your religion 71% 59% 
Immigrants in France   76% 64% 
 
 
Once again, the perception developed by a significant number of French does not fit 
with reality. The differences between the two samples on these indicators are often marginal. 
The impression of being close to the French is even more widespread among the French of 
immigrant origin than in the electorate as a whole, though the difference is statistically non-
significant. The most widespread feeling of closeness is towards members of the same social 
background and generation. Religion or ethnic origin lag far behind these two groups. The 
samples differ for only two groups: feelings of closeness toward the religious group and 
toward the immigrants (respectively a 12% and 22% difference). The religious closeness can 
be easily explained by the more intense religiosity among the RAPFI respondents in contrast 
to the rest of the electorate and particularly the movement of secularization among Catholics. 
Country of origin also matters greatly for the RAPFI respondents. Nevertheless, intensity of 
these feeling of belonging should not be overstated. Most of them feel close, rather than very 
close to these two groups. There is therefore still a distance between the respondents and these 
groups. The closeness toward the country of origin is also widespread, even more than 
religious proximity.  
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But, these particular proximities (religion, country of origin, immigrants) do not 
conflict with feelings of closeness with the national community. Fewer than 30% of the 
RAPFI respondents state more intense feelings of closeness toward their country of origin 
than toward their country of citizenship. As far as religion and immigrants are concerned, this 
schema holds for respectively less than 25% and 20% of the RAPFI respondents. 
Consequently, closeness toward the French community prevails among a large majority of the 
French of immigrant origin. Finally, feelings of closeness based on religion and nationality 
are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary: the two variables are not correlated, 
demonstrating that religious and national dimensions are evaluated independently by 
respondents.  
 To summarize, transnational, religious or ethnic identities are not in conflict with the 
national feeling of belonging. Once again, regarding the question of Islam, French 
representation and reality differ greatly. Furthermore, the communitarianism ideology can be 
characterized simultaneously by a strong sense of belonging to a minority (superior to the 
national closeness) and by the claim of special treatment. Only 4% of the RAPFI respondents 
fit this definition. 
To conclude, France is facing an integration crisis, as shown by the divergences 
among the electorate between assimilationists, republicans and multiculturalists. This crisis 
focuses mainly on two points: the religious factor and the rise of communatarianism. But as 
demonstrated in these pages, it is unclear whether the crisis is real or perceived. France is 
caught in a real paradox. On the one hand, politicians, intellectuals and a major part of the 
electorate believe that the incorporation process has failed and hope for greater assimilation 
and fewer multicultural claims from the French of immigrant origin. On the other hand, the 
new French demonstrate their high level of religious accommodation (when they belong to 
one denomination) and perceive themselves as being part of the French community. This 
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misunderstanding is troublesome, since it could threaten the French Republic through the rise 
of communatarianism and of ethnic separation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 See Nonna Mayer, 2002. 
2 On this debate see Vincent Geisser, La nouvelle islamophobie, Paris, la découverte, 2003 or 
Thomas Deltombe, L'Islam imaginaire: la construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en 
France, 1975-2005, Paris, la découverte, 2005. 
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3 This survey was conducted with the financial support of the Service d’Information du 
Gouvernement (SIG – French Government Information Service), the Centre d’Etudes et de 
Prospectives du Ministère de l’Intérieur (Study and Forecast Centre of the French Home 
Office), the Fonds d’Action et de Soutien pour l’Intégration et la Lutte contre les 
Discriminations (FASILD – Action and Support Funds for Integration and Fight Against 
Discrimination) and the Jean Jaurès Foundation. 
4 For more information about this survey, see Tribalat, 2004. 
5 For more information see Kaltenbach, Tribalat, 2002 
6 A specific trait of this group is their average age - 39 years-old, compared to 46 for 
republicans and 50 for assimilationists.  
7 See Cesari 2004 ; Lavau and Kepel, 2004 ; Venel, 2004 ; Tebbakh, 2004 and 2006.  
8 See Jocelyne Cesari, 2004. 
9 See Hervieu-Leger, 2003 Lambert and Michelat, 1992 
10 See Michelat, 1990. 
11 See Brouard, Tiberj, 2005. 
12 For example, some questions could artificially create an identity clash. For example: “Do 
you feel only French, more French than European, equally French and European, more 
European than French, European only?” or the question asked by the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project: “What do you consider yourself first? A citizen of your country or a 
Muslim/Christian? They place into competition two identities which are not mutually 
exclusive or even comparable for the respondents.  
13 The questions are labelled as follows: Would you say that you are very close, close, not 
close, not close at all to :the residents of your neighbourhood; the French, the citizens of other 
European countries, the citizens of the country from which your family emigrated, the people 
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of your age, the people of your social milieu, the people who share your religion, the 
immigrants in France?  
